Market Discrimination Against the Poor and the Impact 6f
Consumer Disclosure Laws: The Used Car Industry
Although the purpose of increasing market regulation is assumed to be increased protection for buyers, critics of consumer disclosure laws argue that ,this particular regulatory approach to consumer protection will not benefit poorer consumers. The disclosure approach is said to work by correcting the failure of markets to give sellers adequate incentives to produce product information needed for consumers to exercise rational choice. The critics of disclosure as a strategy to help the poor have two general arguments for its ineffectiveness: poor consumers lack the ability to use the information that it provides and/or the markets in which the poor purchase are so flawed that information alone cannot correct their deficiencies.
If these critics are correct, there are two possible problems with disclosure laws viewed as a social policy aimed at benefiting the poor.
At the very least, disclosure may fail to deal with a serious defect in consumer markets: evidence suggests that poor consumers pay more than non-poor purchasers even for similar products (Cap10vitz, 1967; Feldman, 1976, pp. 230-241) . If this is true, and if disclosure laws fail to provide special benefits for the poor, then whatever other merit this approach to consumer protection may have, it will make no -contribution to ameliorating this problem.
Moreoever, the disclosure strategy could potentially worsen the situation of the poor. If disclosure laws do work for some consumers, they will effectively increase the purchasing power of these buyers. But if income-related differences in buyers' behavior or markets. and products are such that the poor receive no benefits from dis'closure laws while the nonpoor secure improved purchasing power, then the, adoption of a general disclosure approach would increase the disadvant,ages of the poor.
This paper examines income stratification in the classic stereotype of consumer fraud in America--the sale of used cars. Not only does this represent a market where information on defects should be crucial in increasing the purchasing power of the buyer, but it is a market upon which low-income consumers particularly depend. For most low-income families, the used car is not only necessary to get them to jobs, but next to housing it is the most expensive purchase they make. Any special purchasing power advantage--either in purchase price or in post-purchase dispute resolution--of the non-poor becomes particularly detrimental"
to the poor as they increasingly compete with middle-income consumers who are turning to the used car market as the prices of new cars escalate.
The question is whether an information disclosure law will actually provide special benefits to the poor by reducing disparity in purchasing power. The Federal Trade Commission is considering jusfu such a regulation for used car sales (Auto News, June 12, 1978:1) .
This study examines several questions concerning market discrimination against the poor and the impact of a consumer disclosure law in the used car industry:
(1) Do the poor in fact pay more for the same used car value and get less redress for defects discovered after purchase?
(2) Can such disparities in purchasing power across income groups be explained by deficient "markl'!t rationality" among the poor such as less ability to use information?
(3) Can such disparities be explained by characteristics of markets or products used disproportionately by low-income consumers?
(4) Does a disclosure law affect such disparity?
We conclude that the poor do pay more for used cars, that the adoption of disclosure regulation does not eliminate this price discrimination effect, and. that the poor get less redress for defects discovered after purchase. At the same time, there was no evidence to support the hypotheses that price discrimination is caused by different market abilities or behavior of the poor or by the poor buying in separate sub-markets . While a disclosure law did not narrow the disparity between the purchasing power of the poor and the non-poor, neither did it enlarge it.
lVhile the critics of unregulated markets are correct in alleging price discrimiriation against the poor, the reasons given for this effect could not be confirmed.· Disclosure laws appear not to reduce this discrimination, but we cannot attribute this failure to the causes normally cited. As a result,while recognizing that consumer protection (designed in part to eliminate price discrimination and thus to especially benefit the poor) must go beyond disclosure, further research is needed before policy makers can design regulatory strategies that will simultaneously· correct general market failures and eliminate discrimination against the poor.
1. DISCLOSURE AND EXPLANATIONS OF DISADVANTAGES OF THE LOW:...INCOME CONSUMER Proponents of the disclosure strategy· argue that buyers in many unregu.
. lated markets· suffer from reduced purchasing power because they· lack· sufficient information to "rationally" maximize their purchasing power or value
received (Barton, 1976) . In the case of used cars, many buyers lack reliable' information ab~ut the mechanical condition or prior history of the product. This makes it more dUff.cult fo:n the buyer' t<:> negptri,at,e, an appropr1.ate pr:lQ.e... When, sellers a~e required' to "disclose" de~ects',.
the increased information is then assumed' to improve the product value received for the satne price. Further , comp,laint resolution should he facilitated' when sellers provide a sta'tement of condition at time 0'£ sale.
The assumption: that incre1:l.sed informat:iJon will enhance purchas.ing power of the consumer is' found in such legislation as truth-in-1ending
and truth--in-packaging law$. and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. The popularity of disclosure as a legislative response to the consumer movement is 1arga1y due to its legal attribute of not infringing upon freedom-ofcontract values.· Since the disclosure-strategy still assumes that consensual ij'a.'rg:ains i in: the; tttaJ:t1<etp'11:1!~e1 ea11lJ slet: tbe! p.roper price for a transaction, it claims to pro'tec:t the' consumer without involving substantive governmental intervention in the market (Whitford, 1973; . Mayer and Nicosia, 1976, p.65) .1
Whatever the merits of disclosure laws for consumers in general, some writers have argued that the disclosure strategy is an i~sufficient response to income stratification in purchasing power. Several clusters of hypotheses suggest that low-income consumers have relatively less purchasing pbwer--both in terms of price paid relative to "real value" and 6f compl1:l.int resolution. Further, the hypothesized mechanisms generating these income disparities are not addressed by the disclosure strategy. We have characterized these arguments as the "market rationality" theme and the "different products and/or markets" effect.
The Poor Have Less "Market Rationa1ityll
Micro-economic theory suggests that consumers have more Il purchasing power" if they act in a certain "market rational" manner. Buyers should accurately evaluate product quality before purchase to assess its "value'.' to them and then negotiate a Ilfair" price. Further, market self-policing is promoted if the buyer reacts to a bad value with subjective dissatisfaction and attempts to impose costs upon the seller by voicing complaints and seeking redress (Hirschman, 1970) .
Income stratification in purchasing power may then be related to characteristics of the poor which limit their effective "market rationality."
The poor, it is argued, are disadvantaged to the extent they are less able to obtain or use information about product quality or the terms of purchase, less able to bargain or to complain effectively, and more complacent about purchase problems (Andreason and Best, 1977) . These disadvantaging ch~x~cteristics of the poor are usually attributed to economic and social constraints on the low-income buyer.
For example, information acquisition and use may be hindered by lower educational attainment and less ability to sustain search costs. Credit availability and "status-seeking and escapism ll may heavily influence. their choices (Schnapper, 1967 '):'he poor face many more prohleJlls in using the legal system for protection (Wexler, 1970 ) and areles.s awar'e of ava:Haple agents of redress (Lev:ine and Preston, 1970, p.89; Steele, 1975) .
'X'ak,en as a who'le, these hypothesized constraints and attributeso'f low-in.come consumers would seem to inyal:Ldate an:Lnfprmation disclo$u:,re strategy. If the poor do not act in a market rational manner, their purchasing power wou.ld not be enhanced by improved information (Schnapper, 1967) . Indeed, if the non-poor benefited dispr.oportionately, the income dispariti.es in purchasing power would increase. Howeyer, it is possible that disclosure re,gulation could manipulate the timing and method of disclosure so as to increase the awareness and aggressiveness of the low-income buyer (Whitford, 1973, pp. 461-462, 467) .
If a disparity in market rationality in fact explains any income disP.C',lr:P:ies :j.n purchC',lsing power'., ,certain differences in the behavior and attitudes of poor and non-poor consumers would be expected. With respect to our data on used car experienc.es, thie market rationality argument suggests that the poor would be less aware of defects in cars before purchase, mOre likely to discover defects after purchase, less dissatisfied, and more reluctant to complain about defects. Before testing these possibilities, the implications of the other arguments put forward by skeptics of disclosure law are outlined,
Different Markets and Products for the foor
The poor may be disadvantaged by both disproportionate participation in certain markets and by the product selection which their limited financial resources dictate. Product markets are often segmented along income lines to some degree by residential segregation of income groups, available credit, and so 'on. Markets in which the poor are concentrated typically sell cheaper, lower quality goods, may be less competitive, and have more marginal and less scrupulous sellers (Schnapper, 1967 ).
These market characteristics would then generate income disparities in both the terms of exchange and dispute resolution. Such patterns have been observed in product areas like retail food and credit markets.
Thus the poor may not be different in the rationality of their purchase transactions, but rather face different and discriminatory market constraints (Andreason, 19~5, Because approximately 75% of consumers sampled did not respond, two procedures were used to test for nonresponse bias. First, 'sample estimates
. were compared to known parameters of the Wisconsin post-law population:
vehicle ages and the proportion of private versus dealer sales. O~der used motor vehicles and private sales were somewhat, but not seriously, under-repesented. Second, a telephone sampling of fifty nonrespondents from each of the four consumer populations asked a select number of questions from the original questionnaire. The distribution of nonrespondents' answers, when compared with·the respondents' P?tterns, indicated that the former group did not significantly deviate from the initial respondents' experiences. The respondents seem to be representative, of the population. sampled.
Measures
The dependent variables include measures ofconsume.rs" purchasing power or success and of their experiences and behavior. Independent.
e~lanatory variables included two product characteristics Cpurchase
price and car age), two marketstrt;1cture cl1aracteristics (the state and private/dealer markets), and three buyer characteristics {income, age, and educat ion) • Measures of consumers' purchasing power. Consumers whQ get better "deals" in buying a us~d car should pay a relatively lower price for a given car .and should incu+ relatively lower repair costs after purchase.
Based on this reasoning, two aspects .of the success of consumers' purchases were used as meaSt;1res of purchasing power •
• Relative price paid. Two price indi.oes were used to represent • Unanticipated repair costs. Two variaples repreaented unanticipated repair costs. Consumers were asked to repo+t repair costs in the first three months after purchase for defects they were unaware of at the time of purchase. One variab1e:was simply coded "1" if any such costs were incurred and "0" otherwise. The second variable, relative repa~r costs, was the ratio of unanticipated repair costs to total purchase and repair expenditures including repair of defects known before purchase.
Measures of other behavior and experiences . . Seven other dependent variables which assessed buyer attitudes toward the purchase, knowledge about the product, and experiences with defects and complaining were 'investigated: buyer . dissatisfaction and belief that something was misrepresented, buyer awareness of any defects before purchase, voicing of complaints to sellers, and complaint success. if the respondent reported. discovering any defects after purchasing the car and "all if not.
• Voice.comp1aint? This variable indexed whether the buyer who discovered a defect after purchase then recontaeted the seller to complain. A dunnny variable was coded "1" if the buyer who discovered the defect after purchase then recontacted the seller and; "0'" if not.
• Complaint resolution. Two variables were used to assess complaint resolution. First a "success scale" was constructed with "I'" ind:Lcating the buyer paid or the defect was not corrected, "2" if the buyer and seller shared repair costs, and "3" indicating the sel1e'r paid for repairs.
Second, a dichotomous variable was coded "1" if a buyer who had voiced a complaint paid for any unanticipated repairs within three months of purchase and "0" if not.
Independent variables:
" Markets, product 'characteristics, buyer demographics.
• Markets. Four dichotomous variables specified the used car buyer population sampled: Wisconsin pre-and post-law, Iowa, and Minnesota.
The Wisconsin post-law variable was deleted from the regression models so that the coefficients of the remaining three test for differences from that population. Another dummy variable indicated whether the buyer purchased from a dealer (coded Ill") or from a private seller (coded "0") •
• Product characteristics. Two product characteristics were included as independent variables: purchase price and car age. Price was coded in thousands of dollars and car age in years .
• Buyer characteristics. Three consumer demographics were included as independent explanators: income, age, and education. Respondents assigned themselves to a category in an ordianl scale for each dimensiQn. 5
The income scale has five categories, the age scale six, and the education scale four.
Analysis ModeJ:s
Linear regression models were used to examine the effects of the above variables on consumers' putchasing power, behavior, and experiences.
Two models were estimated for each dependent variable. Model A included only the dichotomous market structure variables and the buyers' characteristics--income, age and education. This model assessed the total impact of income and other buyer demographics and of the markets. Model B, which also included the product characteristics, tested the "separate products" argument by estimating effects of Model A's variables controlling for the effects of price and vehicle age. For example, income may be expected to affect buyers' experiences indirectly through the limits it sets on purchase price and consequently car age--this is the essence of the "separate products" reasoning. 6 Income may also have direct effects independent of product 'characteristics in which case it could be concluded that some in~ome groups were advantaged or disadvantaged in some way not attributable to product differences.
THE POOR PAY MORE FOR THE SAME USED CAR
Two measures of purchasing power--Price Index I and II--were analyzed first to determine whether the poor do pay more for used cars.
The price indices measure expenditures relative to Blue Book value:
Index I is the ratio of purchase price to Blue Book price and Index II differs only in inc1udi.ng re"air costs with purchase price in the numerator.
Both indices were related in similar ways to indepedent variables (see Table 1 ).
Iowans and those buying from dealers paid more (about 6% and 13% respectively), Expenditures include purchase price and anticipated and unanticipated repair costs.
Standardized regression coefficients are in parentheses. or who purchase older cars seem to obtain less value relative to Blue Book prices. The indirect effects of income via product characteristics are contradictory: Higher income buyers do less well to the extent that they spend more while lower income buyers do less well because they purchase older cars. Net of these indirect effects, income has a further negative direct effect on the Price Indices. Thus, after product characteristics are controlled, low-income buyers seem to suffer additional purchasing power disadvantages amounting to about 2% of Blue Book value for each decrement in the income scale. Buyers with incomes under $6000 paid about 10% more for the same product value as buyers with incomes over $24,000.
I
Is this income disadvantage different in different markets? Table   2 reports coefficients for interaction terms between income and the market variables. In no case do these effects contribute significantly to the explained variation in the price indices. The disadvantage of poorer consumers appears to be constant across the states sampled and between the dealer and private seller markets.
beyond .10 level.
beyond .05 level.
beyond .01 level. *Significant **Signifi~ant ***Significant 1The independent variables whose coefficients are not shown here had effects very similar to those repc,rted in Table 1 .
2 The increment reflects only the effect of the interaction term(s).
Stnadardized regression' coefficients are in parentheses.
These res~lts strongly indicate that price discrimination against the poor is not an artifact of product charaeter,i'stics although it is compounded by the poor buying somewhat older vehicles. No tendency was found for the poor to buy disproportionately in the dealer or, private markets, which indicates that, if there are market differences which explain price discrimination, they don't correspond to the 4'ea,ler!privfj,teseller dimension. Finally, the ob,served income effec,t was not m09:ified in any of the states or in private or dea,lel;" markets", inpicating that
Wisconsin' s disclos~r~law did. not incr~a$e o.r decrease the observed disparity in purchasing power between incom~groups.
The Poor Pay More for Post-Purchase Repairs A separate analysis of repair costs indicated that the pop::!; ?lso have disadvantages after purchase. !he first issue examined was whether defects discove~ed after purohase were serious enough to necessitate spme repair expenditures within three months of purchase. This is a further indicator of purchasing power in that the real value is affected by the costs of repairs that must be made immediately after purchase.
Overall, 46% of resppndents reported finding defects in their cars after purchase. Forty percent of these buyers then paid fQr so~e repairs. However, this proportion ranged from 44% of the lowest income buyers to only 26% of buyers in the highest income category. Table 3 shows the models predicting, first, whether those who discovered defects actually paid to have them corrected. Not surprisingly the best predictor was the age of the car (Model B) which seems to account for lower repair incidences among higher income buyers and those buying from dealers (Model A). In this instance the disadvantage of the poorer consumer is attributable to their purchase of 'older vehicles. .012*** (.389)
.198 Table 3 *Significant beyond .10 1eve1. ** .
Significant beyond •05 level.
***Significant beyond .01 level.
1The models estimate the probability of having incurred unanticipated repair costs within three months of pttrcha:se. Subsample is those reporting. some defect discovered after purchase. N = 388.
2The models estimate the ratio of unanticipated repair costs to total purchase and repair expenditures. SUbsample is those with non-zero unanticipated repair costs. N =156.
3Purchase price is deleted because it is a major component of the denominator.
Standardized regression coefficients are in parentheses. Table 3 also shows coefficients for models predicting the ·ratio of repair costs to total expenditures. Purchase price was deleted from Model B because it is a major component of total expenses. In contrast to the previous dependent variable, car age (and its presumed association with serious defects) does not account for all of the effects of income and the dealer market. Independent of vehicle age, lower income buyers and private market buyers spend relatively more of their total expenditures for unanticipated repair costs.
Why then do the poor pay more? The "separate markets/products" argument does not explain the weaker purchasing power of the poor. Car age does not account for it and, as for the price indices, the income effects, were found to be the same in all markets. The disadvantage of private market buyers, aside from the older mean age of private market cars, may be due to the lack of recourse'available to them when defects are discovered.
But low-income buyers do not participate in the private market more than other buyers. Separate markets and different products do not explain all of the effects of income on purchasing power.
The market rationality hypotheses suggest a number of other possibilities.
Are the poor simply less aware of defects at the time of purchase than the non-poor? Are they more complacent about defects than upper-income groups? Do they complain less or with less effectiveness?
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE POOR AND NON-POOR CANNOT BE EXPLAINED BY THE MARKET IRRATIONALITY OF THE POOR
The essence of the "market irrationality" argument is that the market will only be efficient if purchasers are aware of defects that lower the true value of their purchases, if they are dissatisfied when such defects are discovered after purchase, and if they voice those complaints to the seller. It has been assumed by many that the poor are more likely than the non-poor to fail to perceive defects, fail to be as upset by such defects, and not voice complaints about such defects. Each of these aspects of buyer behavior will be examined to see if the poor possibly pay more because of such market irrationality.
Perception of Defects Before and After Purchase
About 43% of all buyers reported being aware of a defect before purchasing their car. We found that younger buyers and Minnesota buyers were more likely to be aware of a defect (see Table 4 , Model A, "Aware Before").
Buyers in the dealer market were less likely to be aware of any defects apparently because the costlier cars traded in that market have fewer defects or ones that are better concealed (Model B). It is noteworthy that no differences in defect awareness were detected between the pre-and post-disclosure law by Wisconsin buyers. Improved disclosure may have been offset by anticipatory repairs. The key finding, however, is the absence of any direct or indirect income effects. Low-income buyers are neither more nor less aware of defects before purchasing.
Forty-six percent of the respondents reported discovering a defect after they purchased their car. Younger buyers again were more likely to note defects. However in contrast to the pre-purchase situation, buyers in the dealer market were much more likely to find defects after purchase, and product characteristics did not account for any variation in post-purchase defect discovery. Again, no difference was found between o'de1 estimates probability that buyer reports being aware of any defects before purchase. N = 844.
ode1 estimates probability that buyer reports discovering defe'cts after purchase. N =844.
Standardized regression coefficients are in parentheses.
the Wisconsin pre-and post-law buyers. No income effect was found, suggesting that the poor are .not more or less likely to find flaws after purchase. The results suggest that the weaker purchasing power of the poor is not related to lack of awareness of defects at the time of purchase or immediately after purchase.
The Poor and the Degree of Dissatisfaction
The data so far confirm that, on the basis of objective indicators of value received, the poor have more reason to be dissatisfied with their purchase. But the market-rationality argument suggests that the poor will probably have lower expectations and therefore not be as dissatisfied as the objective disparities would suggest. Our data indicate to the contrary that the poor are in fact more dissatisfied than the non-poor and also are more likely to believe that something was misrepresented. Table 5 shows that buyer dissatisfaction and perceived misrepresentation have similar relations with the independent variables. Poorer, younger, and dealer-market buyers are all more likely both to be dissatisfied and to believe the seller misrepresented the mechanical condition or prior history of the car or the seller's post-purchase responsibility. None of these relations are attributable to product characteristics since price and car age have no impact on the dependent variables: The dealer/private-market difference may be due to buyers in the dealer market having worse experiences~.
higher expectations, or both. In any case, additional analysis indicated that the income effects were invariant in the dealer and private markets and across the states. 1The index is the sum of responses to three attitud1na.l items with a high score indicating greater dissa.tisfa.ction. Scale range is 3 to 15. N = 852.
odel estimates probability that buyer :reported something was misrepresented. N = 861.
Complaint Voicing and Resolution
If the poor do not find more defects after purchase and are as capable as other income groups in detecting defects before purchase, what would explain their higher relative repair costs, lower purchasing power, and greater dissatisfaction? It is possible that they are less aggressive in pursuing complaints or have less effective bargaining skills. While we cannot test the bargaining skills hypothesis,8 we can examine complaint voicing and dispute resolution. Because private market sellers offer no warranty or guarantee and very few private market buyers complain about defects (23% .of those discovering defects), we limited this inquiry to the dealer-market buyers.
Complaint voicing. Of those who discovered a defect after purchase, 60.4% recontacted the dealer to complain (Table 6 ). Older buyers and Iowans, who may have been stimulated by their mandatory post-purchase safety inspections, were more likely to complain. Overall there are no income differences in the rates of complaint voicing (Model A); however, when the depressing effect of car age on complaining is included (Model B), the poor are found to actually complain at higher rates. Lower income buyers are not more complacent about defects once the general tendency to complain less about older cars is taken into account.
Complaint resolution. Yfuo are the successful complainers? We used two measures of complaint resolution. The first was a three-point "success scale" indicating whether the seller paid none, some, or all defect repair costs. Its best· single predictor is income (r=.330). The positive effect of income on the success scale is entirely direct; the moderate correlations between the success scale and purchase price (.185) and odelsestimateprobabilitythat buyer recontacted seller to complain.
Subsample is those discovering a defect after purchase. N = 268.
2Indicates buyers' degree of complaint success. Subsample is those voicing complaint to dealer. N = 157. 3Mode1s estimate probability that buyer paid for any unanticipated repairs. Subsamp1e is those voicing complaint to dealer. N = 162.
car age (-.208) were found to be spurious (Model B, "Success Scale").
The second measure indicates whether any money had been spent on repairs by those who complained to the seller about defects. About two-thirds of a:L1 complainers report spending no money for repairs in the first three months--either the dealer paid or repairs were deferred by these buyers.
The prob.ability that the buyer paid anything for repairs shortly after purchase is increased by .085 for each step down the five-step income scale.
Part of this income effect is indirect because of the tendency for owners of older cars to be more likely to ultimately pay for repairs themselves.
That tendency also entirely accounts for the greater complaint success enjoyed by purchasers of costlier cars. Nonetheless, most of the income effect is again direct; product characteristics do not explain the disadvantages of the poor in complaint resolution.
In addition to having lower incomes, the less successful complainers may be younger ("Success Scale") and Iowans ("Any Repair Costs"). The latter were also more likely to complain. The independent safety inspections in Iowa may provide impetus to complain without ammunition to do so effectively; however, the inspections also may cause repair costs to be incurred sooner.
CONCLUSION
Lower income buyers in the used motor vehicle market seem to suffer from price discrimination, relatively greater repair costs, and less successful complaint resolution. Contrary to hypotheses that the poor have less "market rationality" than the non-poor, we found that:
(1) the poor's subjective satisfaction reflects their objective disadvantages;
(2) the poor detect defects before purchase as often as do the non-poor; (3) the poor discover as few or as many defects after purchase as do the non-poor; and (4) the poor complain about such defects at even higher rates thlm do others. An alternative hypothesis is a "separate products" argument which attributes disadvantages of low~income consumers to the less expensive and lower quality goods which their limited resources dictates. However, we found that such product attributes accounted only for the relation between income and whether any unanticipated repair costs were incurred. Observed effects of income on other aspects of purchase experiences were only partially, if at all, attributable to product characteristics. Additional analysis failed to detect any differences in the observed income effects across the market populations sampled and between the dealer and private markets despite differences in the structure and organization and in the legal and economic environments of these markets.
This last finding indicates that Wisconsin's disclosure law--one key legal difference between these markets--did not increase or decrease the relative disadvantage of the poor. One goal of consumer protection law ought to be to eliminate any special disadvantages which the poor encounter in consumer markets. Since conventional explanations of the inadequacy' of disclosure as a policy to benefit the poor are insufficient, these conclusions point to the need for more research on the causes of price discrimination and for more 'attention to the problems of the poor in the design and implementation of consumer protection laws.
We need to understand why the poor do pay more in this and other important consumer markets. We have looked at what consumers do in the marketplace and have failed to find any differences between the way the poor and the non-poor approach the purchase of a car and postpurchase disputes. Further analysis of consumer behavior is necessary to determine if other aspects of this behavior not yet analyzed help explain price discrimination. Some possible areas of purchasing behavior disparities between income groups are the sources of information consulted in a purchase decision (mechanic, friend, etc.), the purchase cr:lteria influencing the decision (mechanical condition, style"price, warranty), the impact of credit availability and arrangements, and bargaining strategies or tactics.
Moreover, the analysis should be expanded to include sellers' behavior. The survey did not allow our determining whether the poor are disadvantaged among all sellers or whether 'it subset who deal primarily with low-income buyers manage to charge higher prices than other sellers of similar vehicles. If the income effects occur across all sellers, it may be because sellers treat the poor and non-poor differently or because of characteristics of the poor themselves such as a lack of bargaining skills. It is possible that a few "rotten dealers" consciously seek out and exploit poor consumers. They may offer better credit terms but charge higher prices and be less responsive to complaints. In this case, disclosure regulation as a strategy for giving leverage to the low-income consumer would be misplaced. It may only increase restrictions on decent dealers who would abide by the law to maintain their reputation while rotten dealers would continue to ignore legal regulations in all but the most symbolic ways.
The "separate markets" hypothesis could not be completely examined.
The findings indicated that the poor do not buy disproportionately in the private or dealer markets and that price and dispute resolution discrimination cannot be explained by .product characteristics. Further evaluation of seller~and buyers is needed before the.causes of incomerelated disadvantages can be identified.
Such research should help to design consumer protection systems which will deal more specifically with the problems of the poor. The original CPR study indicated that the Wisconsin disclosure law worked through four mechanisms: buyer use of disclosure information about defects in prepurchase negotiations; buyer use of the disclosure statement in postpurchase disputes; intervention by motor vehicle inspectors in postpurchase disputes; and anticipatory repairs by dealers who corrected defects before sale.
We have shown that while ·such a disclosure law in the used car industry may have yielded benefits for consumers overall, it did not reduce price discrimination against the poor. It is unclear how a regulatory scheme could be devised to achieve that goal. Such "fine tuning" might include:
• better techniques for disclosure itself;
• more efforts to educate consumers in the use of disclosure data and dispute resolution mechanisms;
• more effective resolution systems to encourage settlement of post-purchase disputes; and e special targeting of dispute resolution and other regulatory techniques on the poor and those who sell to poor consumers.
However, it may be that mor~substantial alteration in consumer protection laws is needed if the special disadvantages of poor consumers are to be alleviated.
APPENDIX A Sampling Procedure
The two Wisconsin samples were selected from the state's motor vehicle title file. Microfilms were selected on a30 to 40 day interval during each of the two-year periods sampled. After a random start, every fifth name was systematically chosen. Where information was illegible or incomplete the next usable title was substituted.
The Iowa sample was drawn from the state's license file which was organized by county. The sampling was conducted on a non-proportionate basis in which counties with higher population concentrations were given greater emphasis. Iowa's state license file uses certain sets of letters for given counties followed by a standard numbering system. Within each letter group, titles were separated into groups of 100. The groups were randomly selected and every fifth title transfer was selected until the county's quota was reached.
The Minnesota sample was selected from the state's motor vehicle title file on microfilm. Separately coded titles designated vehicles involved in transfers. These vehicles were identified by license plate numbers which were selected systematically after a random start •.
The resulting sample of plates were then submitted to a state-wide data bank which contains the information about the car and its previous owner.
A separate questionnaire and cover letter were mailed to each of the four samples of consumers. The response rates were as follows: Eighty consumers f~om the pre-law sample filled out the questionnaire on a used motor vehicle purchased subsequent to the law. These returns were included in the post-law sample for analysis purposes.
NOTES lSome critics of regulatory agencies protecting consumers, e.g. Stigler (1975, pp. 178-188) , argue that self-interest and competition are the only real protections for consumers and that regulation does not benefit consumers "given the nature of our political process, which allows compact groups with substantial per capita interests to win out over diffused masses of consumers " (1975, p. 187) . It is unclear how suc~critics would view disclosure regulation which seeks to enhance some market mechanisms. The characterization of the political process no doubt accounts for some of the popularity of disclosure over more .interventionist strategies. However, we view as problematic the accompanying assertion that consumers' problems are mainly attributable to "suckers" and "rogues" (1975, p. 179) , and this study provides a partial test of that hypothesis.
In any case, the consumers' resources of individual intelligence (caveat emptor) and market competition (1975, p. 178) are not evenly distributed across markets. The presumptions that resulting consumer disadvantages are wholly inevitable and that any regulatory cure is worse than any market's diseases are, we maintain, also problematic and require empirical study rather than polemical assertion or denial. 8It is noteworthy, however, that buyers' education was not significantly related to any dependent variable.
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